Spruyt 1994 The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change
Q: Doesn’t accept bellicist or growth-centered explanations for rise of modern state. Explains rise of new organizational forms (feudalism, the church, and empires, all non-territorial forms of organization => kings, city-leagues, and city-states, territoriality as a dominant principle). The crucial question is not the oft-studied growth of formal government (bureaucracy) but "why some governments took the form of sovereign territorial rule whereas others did not."
Claim: feudalism did not give way to any single successor institution in simple linear fashion.
Methodology [Durkheimian]: Agent-driven choices interaction of individual and state, state as embedded agent. Model of change: social and political realignments following exogenous shock. Gould: punctuated equilibrium: institutional outcomes don’t need to be optimal; there are good reasons for static institutions – transaction costs of change are high.
Cases Examining competing institutions that arose during the decline of feudalism - urban leagues (Germany), city states (Italy) and sovereign monarchies (France); France: Sovereign State Goal was to extend authority to counter feudalist landed elite; Shift to exclusive Roman Law (codified, not personalised, over a strict territorial basis, emphasis on personal prosperity). Germany: Hanseatic League Alliance between towns and lords (weak kings weren’t able to interfere, no sovereign state), organized trade and war; o clear territorial borders or hierarchical structure, prevention of feudalistic organisation. Italy: City States Open for trade, no central authority (strong landed aristocracies), cities under rule of special ‘officers’ (Signoria, Podesta), noble/burgher (citizen) coalition
Findings: (Confirm Gould’s version of evolutionary theory)
dramatic economic change in medieval economy => variety of institutional forms;
selective phase of institutional evolution.
Selection mechanisms: 1) Survival of the fittest; 2) Mutual empowerment; 3) Mimicry and exit. => Sovereign territorial authority proved superior to its rivals in organizing domestic society (mobilizing resources, providing goods, judiciary, enforcement) and structuring external affairs (easier to negotiate).
Summary
Sovereignty developed as result of adaptation, not conflict. Isomorphism through competition;
The territorial sovereign state prevailed owing to its: a) Internal hierarchy; b) territorial demarcation. (War was intermediary cause only)
Critiques: 1. Nature of Institutional Change: Is change sporadic or incremental? what is the turning point?
Is it institutional change or individual preferences for institutional change?
(how did territorial sovereign states develop in the first instance)?
Q: Doesn’t accept bellicist or growth-centered explanations for rise of modern state. Explains rise of new organizational forms (feudalism, the church, and empires, all non-territorial forms of organization => kings, city-leagues, and city-states, territoriality as a dominant principle). The crucial question is not the oft-studied growth of formal government (bureaucracy) but "why some governments took the form of sovereign territorial rule whereas others did not."
Claim: feudalism did not give way to any single successor institution in simple linear fashion.
Methodology [Durkheimian]:
Agent-driven choices interaction of individual and state, state as embedded agent.
Model of change: social and political realignments following exogenous shock.
Gould: punctuated equilibrium: institutional outcomes don’t need to be optimal; there are good reasons for static institutions – transaction costs of change are high.
Cases
Examining competing institutions that arose during the decline of feudalism - urban leagues (Germany), city states (Italy) and sovereign monarchies (France);
France: Sovereign State
Goal was to extend authority to counter feudalist landed elite; Shift to exclusive Roman Law (codified, not personalised, over a strict territorial basis, emphasis on personal prosperity).
Germany: Hanseatic League
Alliance between towns and lords (weak kings weren’t able to interfere, no sovereign state), organized trade and war; o clear territorial borders or hierarchical structure, prevention of feudalistic organisation.
Italy: City States
Open for trade, no central authority (strong landed aristocracies), cities under rule of special ‘officers’ (Signoria, Podesta), noble/burgher (citizen) coalition
Findings: (Confirm Gould’s version of evolutionary theory)
- dramatic economic change in medieval economy => variety of institutional forms;
- selective phase of institutional evolution.
Selection mechanisms: 1) Survival of the fittest; 2) Mutual empowerment; 3) Mimicry and exit. => Sovereign territorial authority proved superior to its rivals in organizing domestic society (mobilizing resources, providing goods, judiciary, enforcement) and structuring external affairs (easier to negotiate).Summary
Critiques:
1. Nature of Institutional Change: Is change sporadic or incremental? what is the turning point?